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small technology start-ups, and (as of this writing) perhaps Sony Pictures Entertainment. As part of that
effort, Congress has taken up the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Trade Secret Protection Act, which would
create a private cause of action under the federal Economic Espionage Act. This Article addresses the
possibility of introducing trolling behavior — using litigation as a means to extract settlement payments from
unsuspecting defendants — to trade secret law through creation of a federal private trade secret
misappropriation cause of action. Like the existing problem of patent trolls, trade secret trolling has the
potential to undermine the structure of trade secret law and create serious problems and costs for innovators
across all industries. Thus, this Article addresses the heretofore unexplored link between patent and trade
secret trolling established by this legislation. It assesses in detail the benefits and downsides of creation of a
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L Introduction
For several years, the bane of the existence of innovators has
been the possibility of being attacked by the "patent trolls," also
alternatively known as "non-practicing entities" or "patent
assertion entities." Concerned legislators have focused on
1. "Patent troll" is the popular name for "patent assertion entity" (PAE),
defined as an "entity that uses patents primarily to obtain license fees rather
than to support the development or transfer of technology." COLLEEN V. CHIEN,
PATENT
ASSERTION
ENTITIES
4
(2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2187314 (describing PAEs in
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deterring trolling activity in the patent space since the passage of
the America Invents Act. 2 There is a wide-ranging consensus, if
not unanimity, that trolling has been a significant drain on
innovation. 3
Trade secrecy has been generally free of similar trolling
behavior, but two bills introduced in the last Congress, and the
general perspective on trade secret law and practice that they
reflect, could disturb that relative peace. The bills, the Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 20144 (DTSA) and the Trade Secret
Protection Act of 20145 (TSPA) (collectively, the Acts), likely to be
reintroduced in the early part of 2015,6 would create a new
a DOJ/FTC hearing on December 12, 2012). PAEs "make it economical to bring
suit, and economical for the defendant to settle, regardless of the merits." Id. at
18-19. Thus, it should be no surprise that PAEs brought 61% of all patent
infringement lawsuits from January 1 through December 10, 2012. Id. at 23.
The potential trolling here is the hyper-aggressive use of alleged trade secret
status to intimidate, vex, and exact settlements, not the acquisition of trade
secret rights for the sole purpose of litigation. In that way, trade secret trolls
may exhibit the same tactical behavior as patent trolls even as their alleged
rights acquisition may differ.
2. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100212 (2012)).
3. Getting a handle on all of the impacts is a challenge. See CHIEN, supra
note 1. The White House has explained that "PAE activities hurt firms of all
sizes. Although many significant settlements are from large companies, the
majority of PAE suits target small and inventor-driven companies. In addition,
PAEs are increasingly targeting end users of products, including many small

businesses."
INNOVATION

ExEc.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND

1

U.S.

(2013),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent-report.pdf.
4. S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014).
5. H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014).
6. See Randall E. Kahnke et al., Top 10 Trade Secrets Developments of
2014:
Part
1,
LAw360.coM
(Dec.
16,
2014,
10:00
AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/603592/top-10-trade-secrets-developments-of2014-part-1 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) ("Although it is uncertain whether
further action will be taken as the current congressional term winds down,
momentum is clearly building and a federal trade secret law may be on the
horizon.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); David R. Pruitt,
Will Congress Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act in 2015?, NAT'L L. REv. (Dec.
12,
2014),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/will-congress-enact-federaltrade-secrets-act-2015 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) ("The House's Trade Secrets
Protection Act and the Senate's Defend Trade Secrets Act are likely to be
considered in early 2015.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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private cause of action under the Economic Espionage Act of
19967 (EEA) with the commendable purpose of addressing the
problem of cyberespionage.8
As recent high-profile incidents reveal, 9 U.S. companies face
significant threats from those who would hack into their
computer systems, including operatives of foreign governments,
organized crime syndicates, and various nuisance hackers and
thrill-seekers.1 0 Evidence even suggests that some governments
are specifically initiating and supporting theft of U.S. trade
secrets from private companies via unauthorized intrusions into
computer networks as a means to further their own economic
development." Other high-profile intrusions, like the recent
unauthorized disclosure of vast quantities of information from
Sony Pictures Entertainment's computer network, remain
shrouded in mystery; was the intrusion the act of a foreign
government, or an inside job? 12 Regardless of the perpetrators,
the Acts purport to address these and other misappropriations
that occur via the use of the Internet and other digital
technology.
Senator Christopher Coons (D-DE), one of the DTSA
sponsors, stated that the Acts are intended to address the
pervasiveness of foreign cyberespionage. As a press release from
his office explains:
In today's electronic age, trade secrets can be stolen with a few
keystrokes, and increasingly, they are stolen at the direction of
a foreign government or for the benefit of a foreign competitor.
These losses put U.S. jobs at risk and threaten incentives for

7. Pub. L. No. 94-12, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012) (prohibiting economic espionage).
9. See, e.g., MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA'S CYBER ESPIONAGE
UNITS 2 (2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant APT1_Report.pdf
(discussing several major cyberattacks by a Chinese hacking organization).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1 (quoting U.S. Representative Mike Rogers, Oct. 2011).

12.

See generally Sony Pictures Hackers 'Got Sloppy', FBI Says, BBC NEWS

(Jan. 7, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30720003 (last
visited Jan. 18, 2015) (discussing speculation on the source of the cyberattack on
Sony) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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continued investment in research and development. Current
federal criminal law is insufficient. 13

However, the Acts do not address, much less solve, these very
real concerns. Instead, as this Article explains, the Acts are most
likely to spawn a new intellectual property predator: the
heretofore unknown "trade secret troll," an alleged trade secretowning entity that uses broad trade secret law to exact rents via
dubious threats of litigation directed at unsuspecting defendants.
By initiating lawsuits designed only to extract settlement
payments or massive damage awards from scared defendants,
trade secret trolls could cause the same drag on innovation and
job growth that has been the hallmark criticism of the wellknown "patent troll." Indeed, as acquiring trade secret status and
initiating trade secret lawsuits-which can include separate
claims involving covenants not to compete, nondisclosure
agreements, and labor mobility-are significantly less expensive
and time-consuming than similar activity in the patent space, the
relatively low barriers to trolling suggests that this activity could
be very widespread. At any rate, the potential for trolling
behavior is rather obvious.
The Acts give rise to trade secret trolls by threatening to
undermine decades of trade secret law and policy. Combined with
an extraordinary power to seize a defendant's assets prior to
judgment, these dangerous Acts incentivize trolling without doing
much of anything for victims of cyberespionage. Thus, this Article
explains the risk of trade secret trolling by expanding upon the
Acts' previously identified infirmities and downsides 14 to explain
the scope of the potential problem and assess alternatives that
would not spur trolling but would still address cyberespionage. To
13. Press Release, Office of Senator Christopher Coons, Senators Coons,
Hatch Introduce Bill to Combat Theft of Trade Secrets and Protect Jobs (April
29,
2014),
http://www.coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/senatorscoons-hatch-introduce-bill-to-combat-theft-of-trade-secrets-and-protect-jobs (last
visited Jan. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See David Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Professors'Letter in Opposition
to the "Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014" (S. 2267) and the "Trade Secrets
Protection Act of 2014" (H.R. 5233), CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc. (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/FINAL%2OProfessors%27%2OLetter%20
Opposing%2OTrade%2OSecret%2OLegislation.pdf (hereinafterProfessors'Letter)
(urging Congress to reject the Acts on behalf of thirty-one U.S. professors).
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be sure, the capabilities of trade secret trolls remain to be seen,
but the risk is very real.
To many, the trade-secret-troll threat born out of the Acts
may not be readily obvious, primarily because the rhetoric
surrounding the Acts focuses on the putative trade secret owner
(i.e., the plaintiff) instead of the equally important businesses,
including many start-ups, that may be wrongfully accused of
trade secret misappropriation (i.e., the defendant). In other
words, the Acts appear to enshrine trade secrecy exclusively
within the realm of property theory, despite the fact that the Acts
are putatively designed to address the torts of unauthorized
intrusions into computer and corporate networks.
To see the threat caused by the Acts requires an
understanding of how the two primary theories of trade secret
law work in tandem to create nuanced law that appropriately
balances the prevention of bad acts with the benefits of free
competition, information diffusion, and employee mobility. While
tort-based concepts of improper acts and wrongful conduct by
individuals and entities pervade trade secret law, a claim of trade
secret misappropriation requires more than just an improper act.
It also requires the actionable form of property colloquially called
a "trade secret." The existence of this property interest, when
acting in concert with the tort rationale, operates to check the
excesses of sole application of either theory. Thus, when an entity
takes something through an improper act that is not a trade
secret, it is not a trade secret misappropriation.
The Acts and the rhetoric surrounding them fail to
appreciate this seemingly obvious point. As a consequence, many
of the bad acts that Congress seeks to prevent will not be
addressed due to the absence of legitimate trade secrets. In other
words, focusing exclusively on protecting perceived trade secret
rights misses the point that what we really care about is
preventing certain behaviors that are deemed wrongful (such as
unauthorized computer hacking).
Ironically, such is the historical purpose of tort law. In this
instance, however, the hyper-focus on property rights has led
Congress astray by creating a proposed tort that focuses more on
alleged property rights than on bad behaviors. Thus, to see the
threats posed by the Acts requires an understanding that not all
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business information, and not even all secret information, has a
property right of protection through trade secret law.
Exacerbating the risks of passing the Acts is the fact that
businesses often believe that they own trade secrets when they do
not and attempt legal actions on alleged misappropriations of
information unworthy of protection due to their suspect secrecy
status. The narrow theoretical orientation reflected in the Acts
has apparently blinded proponents of the Acts to that reality, as
well as the harms identified and critiqued in this Article. Instead,
this Article approaches trade secrecy from the more appropriate
theoretical perspective of trade secrecy as a tort-based concept
focused on wrongful acts, like cyberespionage, rather than tied to
property and ownership.
Additionally, seeing the threat requires an appreciation for
the important and historical values of labor mobility and the
diffusion and sharing of knowledge and information that underlie
U.S. economic development. One of the reasons trade secret law
does not involve exclusive property rights is because those values
need to be balanced against the protection of trade secrets.15
Unfortunately, the Acts ignore all but property values while
reinforcing misunderstandings and misconceptions about the role
of trade secrecy in innovation theory and policy. Instead of
clarifying the law, they muddy the waters. Rather than
addressing cyberespionage, the Acts point to one result: the
advent of the trade secret troll, a beast borne of information
control rather than diffusion.
This Article discusses, in Part II, the factual and theoretical
predicates of the Acts and their ramifications for the birth and
expansion of trade secret trolls. Through discussion of the threat
of the yet-unknown trade secret troll, it also frames the
discussion about trade secrecy around information diffusion and
the tort of misappropriation, rather than the problematic focus on
property rights and ownership. In that way, the Article steers the
discussion about trade secrecy away from the property-centric

15. See id. at 4 ("A hallmark of all US intellectual property laws, including
trade secret law, is that they include limiting doctrines that are designed to
achieve the appropriate balance between the protection of intellectual property
rights and the preservation of free competition.").
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focus usually applied to tort-like thefts, about which innovators
and policymakers are rightly concerned, and toward its
traditional grounding in unfair competition law. Built upon this
reorientation, Part III suggests alternatives to the Acts in
addressing the threat of cyberespionage, primarily by amending
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.16
II. FactualPredicatesand the Troll
To understand the threat of trolling-and, therefore, how
trade secret trolls could emerge-requires an appreciation of the
current state of trade secret law, developed in this Article by
examination of five of the core factual predicates in favor of the
Acts. Proponents of the Acts proffer these factual predicates with
little critical analysis.1 7 Accepting the following factual predicates
as asserted would foster an environment where trade secret trolls
might flourish.
The failure to adequately explore these factual predicates has
been a clarion call that this Article seeks to correct. In that way,
this Article seeks to engender a more granular understanding of
the theory and practice of trade secret law for a modern, porous,
and technologically-infused economy and society. The need for
this analysis transcends the Acts, as trade secrecy is on the rise
both as a commercial practice and a source of litigation. Thus,
scholars and policymakers should apply the assessment and
concern about incentivizing trade secret trolls described below to
any future efforts to alter trade secret law at the state or federal
level.

16.

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).

17. There have been two significant critical articles written about trade
secret law reform, both opposed. See Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The
Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to CyberMisappropriation,16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014); Christopher Seaman, The
Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2397567.
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A. Harms: "We Know What We Need to Know to Pass the Acts."
A principal premise of the proposed legislation is that billions
of dollars of U.S. trade secrets have been misappropriated in
recent years and that trade secret holders need federal legislation
to solve this problem.18 However, getting a fix on exactly how
much information, let alone how many actual trade secrets, is
being misappropriated and by whom is a difficult task, leading to
a dearth of reliable data. Nor can the threat to trade secrets as a
result of cyberespionage be accurately measured. As John
Villasenor recently explained, it is "impossible to know how many
trade secret misappropriation incidents are tied to cybersecurity
breaches." 19 While Villasenor concedes that "there is good reason
to believe that many of them are,"20 it is a fool's errand to attempt
to create a complex new federal cause of action under such
uncertainty, as the likelihood of making things worse is at least
as great as the chance of improvement. The certainty, if any, is
that the Acts will do more harm than good.
The aforementioned breach of Sony's computer network
provides a case in point. Although state-sponsored cyberespionage was suspected initially,21 experts in hacking have
recently opined that the data breach was the result of a rogue
employee(s) who, apparently, had legitimate access to Sony
Picture's stored data for years. 22 If So, this event is an example of
18. See Argento, supra note 17, at 174-76 (discussing background for
introduction of trade secret legislation); Seaman, supra note 17, at 4-5 (noting
that "intellectual property theft is estimated to cost U.S. firms billions of dollars
annually").
19. John Villasenor, Corporate Cybersecurity Realism, Managing Trade
Secrets in a World of Where Breaches Occur 9, 43 AIPLA Q.J. (forthcoming
2015), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2488756.
20. Id.
21. See Michael S. Schmidt et al., F.B.I. Says Little Doubt North Korea Hit
Sony,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
7,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/business/chief-says-fbi-has-no-doubt-thatnorth-korea-attacked-sony.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See Dana Liebelson, Ex-Sony Employees Echo Cybersecurity Company's
Suspicion That Hack Was An Inside Job, HUFFINGTON PosT (Jan. 7, 2015, 12:59
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/06/sony-hack_n_6425262.html
(last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

HERE COME THE TRADE SECRET TROLLS

239

information disclosure by employees that is already actionable
under existing trade secret law, rather than a new form of
wrongdoing that needs a new federal cause of action.
Alternatively, if this was a hack orchestrated by the North
Korean government, then utilizing trade secret law will assuredly
not be an effective remedial route for Sony. 23 Moreover, it appears
that much of the information that was allegedly hacked would
not qualify for trade secret protection, rendering trade secret law
utterly irrelevant to the issue. And yet, we can expect that the
Sony example will be used to justify the need for the Acts.
Another reason for the dearth of reliable data is the
aforementioned lack of understanding of trade secrecy's nuances.
The methodology used to collect loss statistics is often based upon
surveys by business executives who do not understand the scope
and limits of trade secret law-specifically, the definition of a
trade secret and of misappropriation. 24 Without knowledge of the
intricacies of trade secret law, claims of trade secrets loss tend to
be overstated because the responses to the surveys are more
likely based upon the layperson's definition of a trade secret,
which, unlike the legal definition, usually includes any
information that a business keeps secret. Similarly, many
business executives may not be aware that reverse engineering is
a proper means of acquiring trade secrets or that the value of
trade secret information, if any, must derive directly from its
secrecy. Also, the surveys do not typically ask whether the
respondents have been sued for trade secret misappropriation
and how much they had to spend to defend illegitimate claims,
costs that should be balanced against the asserted benefits of the
Acts.
We also have inaccurate data concerning the source of
threats to trade secrets and the magnitude of the threat of foreign
espionage. 25 The existing data establishes that the bulk of all
23. For a potential framework to address this problem, see Lawrence J.
Muir, Jr., Combatting Cyber-Attacks Through National Interest Diplomacy: A
TrilateralTreaty with Teeth, 71 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. ONLINE 73 (2014).
24. See Villasenor, supra note 19, at 10 (noting the difficulty in putting a
number on trade secret and cybersecurity losses).
25. See id. at 10-11 (discussing the known, and unknown, threats to trade
secrets and cybersecurity). Even if we assume that there are significant threats
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trade secret cases are of the domestic variety, typically involving
alleged breaches of confidence in the context of business-tobusiness and employer-employee relationships. 26 Trade secret
cases based upon the alleged acquisition of trade secrets by
espionage and other improper means are much fewer in number.
Moreover, there is no data to support the assertion that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) is unwilling or unable to prosecute
the handful of cases annually that involve foreign espionage. 27
Despite the foregoing, even assuming (as we do) that trade
secret misappropriation is a significant problem that requires a
remedy, the United States already has a robust body of civil and
criminal trade secret law that currently provides the most
stringent protection in the world.28 Thus, it is unclear how limited
statistics justify the adoption of a federal civil cause of action.
Indeed, according to the recently updated Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Trade Secret Protection
Index, the current trade secret protection system of the United
States ranked highest among the countries studied, receiving 4.5
out a possible 5 points. 29 This establishes-with as good a data
set as we might currently find-that the current system is
already doing great work protecting the trade secrets of U.S.
businesses.
The dearth of data, combined with a widely held but
unsubstantiated belief that a federal private cause of action
would help, will not help to address, much less solve, the
of espionage from individuals who are located outside of the United States
despite the existence of meaningful data, the Acts do not even begin to address
those threats, as the proposed legislation does not have any extraterritorial
effect outside of the United States. See infra Part I.B.
26. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GoNz. L. REV. 57, 59-60 (2011); David S. Almeling
et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45
GoNz. L. REV. 291, 303 (2010).
27. These allegations remain unsupported, especially as the DOJ may work
with private industry in ways that do not result in prosecution, but rather
support (i.e., assistance in conducting investigations). See infra Part II.C.
28. See Professors'Letter, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing existing state and
federal law).
29. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETs 2
(2014),
http://www.oecd.org/trade/tradedev/OECD-tad-protection-of-tradesecrets-web-annotation.pdf.
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unquantified problem of cyberespionage. Rather, a federal civil
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation is far more
likely to be wielded by those who seek to exact rents from the
unwary and utilize litigation as a method of competitive
destruction rather than innovation. 30 Thus, it portends the
creation of the "trade secret troll" because there is a significant
risk that a new federal civil cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation will be used too aggressively by those who think
they own trade secrets when, in many situations, all they own is
information that they think is valuable or, as in the case of Sony
Pictures, embarrassing. Until now, this eventuality has not even
been considered, much less analyzed, but it appears to be a far
more certain outcome than any other.
To avoid the creation of trade secret trolls, detailed public
hearings are needed. These hearings must focus on the range of
interests at stake, from small businesses for whom litigation is a
difficult or impossible financial burden, to civil society that wants
access to trade secret information, to trade secret defendants, and
to the federal judiciary that will necessarily be called upon to
hear more cases. Congress must scrutinize the existing data for
evidence that might support or undermine the assumptions
baked into the Acts-namely, that foreign cyberespionage
requires a federal private remedy. Policymakers should then
balance this evidence against the costs of a new federal claim for
relief, including the potential misuse of trade secret
misappropriation claims to disrupt competition and quell
employee mobility. In other words, the risk of trade secret trolling
must be part of the discussion.
Especially when compared to the many recent hearings
involving copyright and patent reform, 3 1 the Acts have received
30. See Professors'Letter, supra note 14, at 3-4.
31. See CongressionalHearings on the Review of the Copyright Law 2014,
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://copyright.gov/laws/hearings/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2015) (listing eleven separate hearings in 2014 held by the House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet on
copyright reform) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Testimony
and
Statements,
AIPLA,
http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/congress/Pages/Testimony.aspx (last visited Jan.
11, 2015) (listing a litany of letters and testimony offered to Congress over the
past few years, most of which concern patent law) (on file with the Washington
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virtually no critical attention and have yet to be the subject of
any robust public hearings. Although public hearings have been
held concerning the problem of cyberespionage, 32 almost all
attention has been paid to the voices of large corporations and
their lobbyists who have focused exclusively (and naturally) on
the threats to their valuable information. To be sure, this is an
important concern that most agree needs to be addressed more
thoroughly. However, there is another side to this issue-that of
the defendants in trade secret cases, many of whom are the
individuals and businesses that our intellectual property law
policy purports to encourage.
The voices of talented individuals who simply wanted to
progress in their careers by switching jobs, only to be sued for
trade secret misappropriation, have not been heard. Nor have the
voices of entrepreneurs and small businesses that had an idea for
a better product or service but found themselves in the midst of
trade secret litigation because they hired talented people from a
competitor company. Or, for that matter, any defendant who
found itself on the wrong side of an aggressive trade secret
plaintiff whose tactics, regardless of the merits of the dispute,
caused it economic harm. The assertion of unfounded trade secret
claims are torts in and of themselves that warrant discussion and
evaluation in future hearings around the Acts.
It is axiomatic that law must be based on the best
information that can be adduced from the range of legitimate
interests that exist within a policy area. Congress has not yet
begun to gather that information. Thus, before Congress creates a
new avenue into federal courts for trade secret plaintiffs, it
should have a clear understanding of the impact, costs, benefits,
and ramifications of such a path on trade secret defendants.
Therefore, the voices of those who may be victimized by a
putative trade secret troll's aggressive litigation tactics, and
perhaps more significantly, threats of litigation, must be shared
and Lee Law Review).
32. See, e.g., Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property
and Technology: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations,
113th
Cong.
(2013),
http://
energycommerce. house. gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce. house.gov/files/He
arings/ OI20130709/HHRG-113-IF02-MState-MOO1151-20130709.pdf.
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with policymakers in the same settings that have been afforded
large corporations and their lobbyists. Enacting the Acts without
the hearings and debate is a surefire way to create the
unintended harms associated with trade secret trolls.
B. Law: "The Acts Create Uniformity Because Current U.S. Trade
Secret Law Lacks It."
Another argument for the Acts suggests that the purported
lack of uniformity in state trade secret law makes enforcement of
trade secret rights time-consuming, slow, and resourceintensive. 33 Meanwhile, so the argument goes, trade secrets are
being ferried out of the United States. However, the assertion
that U.S. trade secret law is not substantially uniform is incorrect
and misleading, particularly with respect to the key definitions of
a "trade secret" and "misappropriation."34 The assertion is also
inconsistent with representations that the United States has
made to the World Trade Organization regarding U.S. compliance
with Article 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 35 This factual
predicate primarily benefits trade secret trolls to the extent that
it is believed, but it is simply not true.
The fact is that U.S. trade secret law is very uniform due to
the widespread adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA). The definitions of a trade secret and of misappropriation
that apply in forty-seven states are the UTSA definitions (with
some minor but insignificant differences in some states). 3 6 These

definitions, in turn, are consistent with both the language of
33. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 35 n.240 (discussing proposed benefits of
the Acts).
34. See id. at 43 n.296 (noting that "the Federal Circuit has acknowledged
[that] 'trade secrets law varies little from state to state"' (quoting TianRui Grp.
Ltd. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2011))).
35. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights art. 63.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex iC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; see also First Submission of
the United States, United States-Main Dedicated Intellectual Property Laws
and Regulations, Table AIII.4, IP/N/1/USA/1 (Jan. 20, 1996) (listing applicable
state law).
36. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 36 (discussing the widespread adoption
of the UTSA).
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Article 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and the existing Economic
Espionage Act because the UTSA definition was used as the
model in both instances. In the three states that have yet to adopt
the UTSA (North Carolina, New York, and Massachusetts), both
applicable statutes and case law define a "trade secret" and
"misappropriation" in ways that are generally consistent with the
UTSA definition. 37 So from where does this argument derive?
Sometimes the perceived lack of uniformity is based upon a
failure to appreciate the effect of other principles of law on the
application of trade secret principles. Trade secret law, having
been developed at common law in the United States, is closely
tied to other areas of state law that, depending upon the case, a
court will apply in trade secret litigation. 38 Among these laws are
common law and statutory principles of employment law, duties
of confidence, antitrust law, unfair competition law, and civil
procedure. Thus, when people complain of a lack of uniformity in
trade secret law, it is often because of the application of these
other areas of law and is not a result of a lack of uniformity of
trade secret doctrine. 39
Significantly, the Acts do not address these ancillary legal
doctrines; nor could they, given the fact that these doctrines often
reflect the values and interests of individual states. More
importantly, many of these state laws operate to prevent trade
secret claims from being used as anti-competitive weapons and
are, therefore, important constraints on the emergence of trade
secret trolls. In other words, entrepreneurial individuals and
start-up companies often benefit from the space that these
doctrines create to legally compete and maneuver. They also
provide the critical "balance" between legal and illegal behavior
that all intellectual property laws in the United States are
supposed to have. Their absence in the Acts herald the emergence
37. See Argento, supra note 17, at 178 (discussing the holdout states);
Seaman, supra note 17, at 36 (discussing the three holdout states).
38. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 48 (discussing the interrelated nature of
trade secret claims and other areas of state law).
39. See id. at 47 n.325 (noting that "even 'under a federal trade secret
statute, trade secret owners would likely be faced with geographic differences in

the case law interpreting that statute"' (quoting

AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW

Ass'N, REPORT OF THE AIPLA TRADE SECRETS COMMITTEE

(2007))).
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of trade secret trolls who will thrive in a plaintiff-friendly space
built on the principle of empowering those on the litigation
offensive. Use of the Acts will undoubtedly move well beyond the
cyberespionage situations that they are intended to address.
The argument that U.S. trade secret law is not uniform also
evinces a lack of understanding of the practical significance of
minor differences in the UTSA as adopted by a handful of
states. 40 More often than not, these differences involve procedural
issues, such as the applicable statute of limitations or the burden
of proof on some issues. In the few states where the definition of a
trade secret differs from the UTSA definition, the difference is
usually because the statute adds to the litany of things that can
be a trade secret without really changing the uniform definition
(which is very broad without an expanded litany). Efficient
administration of justice and commerce in the U.S. relies heavily
upon scores of uniform laws (including the Uniform Commercial
Code) that, as adopted by the various states, are not precisely
uniform. Thus, to use the asserted lack of uniformity in U.S.
trade secret law as a justification for the Acts would set a terrible
precedent and could undermine federalism by justifying federal
legislation in areas that have long been the province of the states.
Trade secret owners often perceive a lack of uniformity in
trade secret law because of the fact-specific nature of trade secret
claims and the fleeting nature of trade secret rights. 41 As noted
previously, a business will oftentimes believe that it owns
valuable trade secret information when, in fact, it does not. This
can happen because information can cease being a trade secret
through proper disclosures of the information by others. Indeed,
under well-established trade secret doctrine, information can stop
being a trade secret due to no actions or fault of the trade secret
owner. This reality explains why a trade secret plaintiff may win
a case in one state in year one and lose a similar case in another
state in year two. Thus, we should not mistake the failure of a
40.

See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade

Secrets Act, 19

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA

&

ENT.

L.J. 769, 779 (2009)

(discussing the benefits of creating a federal trade secret law, even if differences
between states are small).
41. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 47 (discussing "fact-specific
decisionmaking").
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plaintiff in a trade secret case to prove its case by a
preponderance of the evidence with a lack of uniformity. Instead,
it should be viewed as the proper policing of what is and is not a
trade secret.
The Acts will set the stage for the emergence of trade secret
trolls by enshrining less uniformity, not more, into trade secret
law, 42 and by eliminating essential checks against plaintiff abuse
of power. Underscoring this point, the fact that the Acts have a
statute of limitations that is two years longer than that set forth
in the UTSA creates disunity on its face. 4 3 We should fully expect
federal lawsuits after the time a state claim for relief has expired,
a wonderful point of leverage for the trade secret troll. That
leverage would allow for trade secret trolls to exact payments
from defendants even as state courts have washed their hands of
a dispute and potentially beyond the actual life of the trade
secret.
Moreover, as a practical matter, longer statutes of limitations
maintain uncertainty and unpredictability about legal exposure
that can stall innovation and progress. In the case of trade secret
misappropriation, the greater the uncertainty that the law
creates with respect to a potential trade secret misappropriation
claim, the less likely that we will see the benefits of protecting
trade secrets, like innovation and job growth. As many trade
secrets do not last very long anyway, it seems reasonable to
require trade secret owners to act quickly or lose their rights to
bring a lawsuit because the alternative scenario of quelling
competition and entrepreneurship is much worse.
Several hypothetical questions illustrate how the very
passage of the Acts could create less uniformity. When federal
judges hearing cases under the new law encounter an issue (such
as the definition of a duty of confidentiality or the meaning of
"reasonable efforts") that is not addressed by the law, what law
will they apply? Will they create federal jurisprudence to fill in
the gaps or will they use legal principles of a state? If the latter,
what if there is no consensus on various issues of state law, like
42. See id. at 43-48 (discussing various ways that federalization may result
in less uniformity).
43. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT § 6 (1985).
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application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine 44 and
enforcement of noncompete agreements, both of which can be
tools of hyper anti-competition? For instance, will they use
Florida's view concerning the enforceability of noncompete
agreements or California's view? 4 5

Particularly while federal jurisprudence is developing to
apply the new law, we should expect aggressive trolling to emerge
while courts sort out what the Acts actually do and do not do and
how to respond to their notable weaknesses. While the foregoing
questions are sorted out, the trade secret troll will enjoy the
unsettled terrain and perhaps succeed in keeping it unsettled for
quite a while. 46 We need to ask whether this disruption of U.S.
44. There is currently a split among the states concerning whether the
inevitable disclosure doctrine of U.S. trade secret law should be recognized or
whether it amounts to an improper implied noncompete agreement. Compare,
e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), with Whyte v.
Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002).
45. Although most states in the United States find "reasonable"
noncompete agreements enforceable if they are designed to protect a "legitimate
business interest," there are significant differences of opinion among the states
on the issues of: (1) what constitutes a legitimate business interest and (2) what
restrictions are reasonable. Pursuant to a law dating back to 1872, California
(arguably the most entrepreneurial state in the Union) takes the position that
most noncompete agreements are void ab initio and that the use of such
agreements to protect trade secrets is not a legitimate business purpose. See
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2014) ("Except as provided in this chapter,
every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."); Edwards v.
Arthur Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008). Florida is among a handful of
states that are on the other end of the continuum when it comes to the
enforceability of noncompete agreements. Generally, they are presumed to be
valid unless proven to be unreasonable. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2014)
("[E]nforcement of contracts that restrict or prohibit competition during or after
the term of restrictive covenants, so long as such contracts are reasonable in
time, area, and line of business, is not prohibited.").
46. Another argument in favor of the Acts is that it will be easier to explain
and understand U.S. trade secret law if there is a federal private cause of action.
So the argument goes, it will be easier for U.S. negotiators to get other countries
to agree to adopt trade secret law similar to U.S. law if it can be easily
understood. If that argument is being weighed, it should be noted that to the
extent that creating a federal private cause of action under the EEA is designed
to be a negotiating tool in current ongoing, albeit secret, trade negotiations like
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, it may actually have the
opposite effect of making U.S. law appear scattered rather than targeted. The
United States' best argument for international adoption of trade secret
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law is worth the marginal and speculative procedural benefitS 47
that might result from a federal law versus a widely adopted
uniform law.
C. Plaintiffs Story: "Without the Acts, It Is Difficult or Impossible
to (a) Stop FleeingMisappropriators,(b) Conduct Cross-Border
Discovery, or (c) Enforce State Judgments in Cases Filed in State
Court."
As best as the authors of this Article can tell, the most
compelling factual scenario for the Acts is the first scenario
above, the case of the fleeing misappropriating employee,
particularly in multiple party cases when complete federal
jurisdiction does not exist. The hypothetical (or reality) would be
as follows: employee of company headquartered in state A plugs a
thumb-drive into a computer and saves her employer's trade
secrets to it. Employee leaves state A and heads immediately to
an international airport in state B. Employer and fleeing
employee have limited or no contacts with state B, making
employer's willingness and ability to sue in state B questionable.
Moreover, depending upon state B's long-arm statute, acquisition
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant may be difficult, and
therefore the employer may not be able to interdict the fleeing
employee in state B through state B's courts. Federal law, so the
argument goes, would allow for "national process" and the ability
of the employer to more easily and quickly go into federal court in
state A to prevent bad behavior in state B: to stop the rogue
employee from getting on an airplane bound for a foreign country.
The foregoing story, while compelling, has factual holes.
While it is undoubtedly a challenge to deal with a fleeing
employee or multiple parties located in different states, court
principles and enforcement is the general success of our state-based innovation
economy, which protects legitimate secrets while encouraging collaboration.
While such a system could be improved, particularly on the access to
information side, the Acts represent an unnecessary complication and
bureaucratic layering rather than a solution. U.S. negotiators will have a much
easier time explaining and justifying current U.S. trade secret law than
explaining the muddied law that the Acts would spawn.
47. See infra Part II.C-E.
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process, be it state or federal, is likely to be similarly
cumbersome. Moreover, the magnitude of the problem (compared
to all trade secret misappropriation claims) is not known. Given
that many trade secret cases already land in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction, the percentage of cases that could
conceivably benefit from the Acts is significantly less than 100%.
This is not only because some cases can already be filed in federal
court based upon diversity jurisdiction, but because not all trade
secret misappropriation cases would meet the "in commerce"
requirements of the Acts.
Proponents of the Acts have not adequately explained exactly
the scenario about which they are concerned nor what is lacking
under the current trade secret regulatory system, which includes
well-developed processes for cross-state litigation and border and
criminal enforcement efforts. Indeed, the DOJ already has
protocols in place to handle these scenarios successfully. In a
2009 U.S. Attorneys' Bulletin, an author discussed exactly this
situation, wherein "law enforcement ... learns that the
defendant may have misappropriated trade secrets and is leaving
the country in 48 hours or may be leaving the company
imminently." 48 The DOJ identified a typical example of this
behavior: "The defendant is at the airport and preparing to leave
the country when an experienced U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Officer notices something unusual and begins asking
appropriate questions, revealing misappropriated trade secrets in
the defendant's luggage or on the defendant's laptop." 49 Thus, the
above is not a situation in which law enforcement lacks capacity
and existing resources can prevent movement outside of the
United States.
Noting that "prompt decisions concerning border searches
typically are necessary,"5 0 the Bulletin discusses
law

48.

Mark L. Krotoski, Common Issues and Challenges in Prosecuting Trade

Secret and Economic Espionage Act Cases, U.S.

ATTORNEYS' BULLETIN,

Nov.

2009,
at
2,
12,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usab5705.pdf.
49. Id. at 12 (citing United States v. Jin, No. 04-cr-20216 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9,
2008)).
50. Id. at 13.
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enforcement's ability to handle a scenario exceedingly similar to
the primary scenario offered by the proponents of the Acts:
Based on a tip, investigators learn of the misappropriation just
before two defendants are boarding their international plane,
requiring a decision on whether to arrest the defendants at the
border. A search reveals that the defendants possess suspected
trade secrets from four Silicon Valley companies, including
technical schematics, information about design methodology,
computer aided design (CAD) scripts, microprocessor
specifications, and other technology information.51
These latter two stories are not hypotheticals, but examples
of cases that actually arose. Thus, the DOJ has the expertise and
experience to handle such scenarios. The real problem is that it
can be difficult to discover trade secret misappropriation of this
sort, but the Acts do nothing to address that problem.
Fortunately, contacting or tipping off law enforcement
requires no court process and, if an actual threat exists, is
undoubtedly a faster route to intercepting a rogue employee at an
airport than attempting to get a court involved. Additionally, if
the above scenarios include the element of surprise and the need
for quick action, there will be nothing quicker than contacting
law enforcement directly. In sum, it is unclear that the Acts
would create a procedure that would be any quicker than that
already in place. The law can do little to help companies prevent
and detect trade secret misappropriation, which is a separate
problem that we address below.
With regard to concerns about the costs of cross-border
discovery and enforcement, they are true to a degree because
applicable federal procedure is marginally more efficient than
having to seek discovery and enforcement orders in more than
one state. Nonetheless, cross-border discovery and enforcement,
particularly among U.S. states, is not as difficult or costly as
some suggest. There are existing procedures in place both within
and outside of the United States (including applicable
international agreements) that are currently used in all manner
of civil and commercial litigation. But because the Acts will have
only limited extraterritorial effect, they will not improve the
51.

Id. (citing United States v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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existing conditions for international cross-border discovery and
enforcement. In other words, while it is possible under existing
language in the EEA to sue a U.S. citizen, a permanent resident
alien, and even a foreigner in federal court for conduct occurring
outside of the United States, 52 this provision of law does not
address discovery and enforcement proceedings in another
country at all.
Indeed, this factual predicate evinces a lack of understanding
of the procedures that are currently available for the enforcement
of foreign judgments and the conduct of transnational discovery
(both among states and in foreign countries). Currently, fortyseven states have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, which makes the enforcement of state judgments
as easy as what currently exists between federal courts. 53
Essentially, the process requires the filing of an exemplified copy
of the judgment with the appropriate court. 54 With respect to the
enforcement of judgments in and from other countries, the
process is admittedly more difficult, but the Acts do not even
begin to address this problem, and Congress has shown little
willingness to join existing international agreements concerning
the enforcement of foreign judgments.
With respect to discovery, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do provide for greater ease of cross-border discovery
than applicable state law procedures, but state law processes are
routinely used by U.S. litigants and are not onerous. With respect
to discovery in foreign countries, the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 55 and
the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory 56 often apply
to streamline the process, but, as with enforcement, the Acts do
not directly address whatever discovery difficulties may apply in
the rare trade secret cases that involve foreign defendants.

52. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2012) (discussing EEA application to conduct
occurring outside the United States).
53. See generally UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTs ACT (1964).
54. See id. § 2 (describing the effect of a judgment that has been filed with
a court).
55. Mar. 18, 1970, U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241.
56. Apr. 15, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-27 (1984).
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Finally, if the costs of cross-border litigation are a major
concern of Congress, then that concern transcends trade secret
law. But instead of approaching this purported problem
holistically by aiding all commercial litigants, the Acts single out
trade secrecy for special treatment without establishing the
factual predicates for such exclusivity. Instead of solving the
problems that exist, the Acts-at best and under very limited
circumstances-create redundant procedures that are less
effective against actual mis appropriators than simply contacting
law enforcement directly. Thus, the Acts would miss actual
misappropriators but allow trade secret trolls to roam free in a
confused and unsettled environment, threatening or initiating
lawsuits for the sole purpose of exacting settlement payments,
just like existing patent trolls.5 7
D. Asset Seizure: "ExistingSeizure Provisions are Inadequate,
Requiring the Acts' New Remedies."
Another argument in favor of a proposed federal civil right of
action for trade secret misappropriation concerns the asserted
need for a new "seizure" remedy to prevent spoliation of evidence
and actual use of misappropriated trade secrets.58 Once again,
the need for this remedy is unsubstantiated and appears to be
overstated. Instead, this broad seizure power, even with
attempted checks against improper use, is likely to be the most
potent weapon to be wielded, and abused, by the trade secret
troll.
First, it is unclear from the language of the Acts why the
existing power of state and federal courts to issue temporary
restraining orders is not sufficient to protect the interests of
deserving plaintiffs. Under applicable law governing the grant of
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, courts
already have broad discretion to order the seizure of information

57. See CHIEN, supra note 1, at 69 (noting that according to one study of
patent trolls, "[b]ased on 900 litigations, in the majority of them, the legal costs
exceed the settlement").
58. See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 17, at 27-31 (describing the seizure
remedy in the Acts).
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and they are known to do so. 5 9 Additionally, if the destruction of
evidence is the concern, there is already a considerable body of
substantive and procedural law that prohibits the destruction of
evidence, including federal criminal law, 60 similar state laws,
rules of professional conduct, and the tort of spoliation of
evidence.
It is also unclear exactly why and to what extent such a
remedy is needed. The vast majority of trade secret cases are of
the "breach of confidentiality" variety, involving individuals and
companies in some sort of commercial or employment
relationship and the voluntary disclosure of the trade secrets by
the trade secret owner. In other words, many trade secret
misappropriation claims do not involve the sort of off-site
computer hacking activity that is a principal justification for the
Acts. Moreover, having voluntarily shared its trade secrets, the
trade secret owner (if it planned ahead) should have the power to
control such usage and to secure necessary evidence from its
employees-by reserving, for instance, the right to search
company premises, requiring the return of company property, or
engaging in timely exit interviews.
With respect to entity defendants (e.g., a new employer), it is
standard practice for larger and more sophisticated companies to
place a "legal hold" on documentary and digital information once
the threat of litigation is known. 61 Therefore, particularly in
employer/employee cases, it is likely that both the plaintiff and
the defendant will have procedures in place to prevent the
destruction of evidence. Moreover, while the actual destruction of
information taken by a former employee may make it more
difficult to prove the misappropriation, such destruction is
beneficial to the trade secret owner to the extent it eliminates the
threat of wrongful disclosure or use of the information (the only

59. FED. R. CIv. P. 65; see Daniels Health Scis., LLC v. Vascular Health
Scis., LLC, 710 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding a preliminary
injunction granted in a case for misappropriation of trade secrets).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012) (describing the penalty for destruction,
alteration, or falsification of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy).
61. See FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b) committee note (2006) (regarding electronically
stored information).
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claim that is available if the information was voluntarily provided
by the trade secret owner).
Admittedly, spoliation of evidence concerns pale in
comparison to the potential use and disclosure of trade secrets
themselves; thus, the latter concern provides a stronger
argument in favor of the proposed seizure order. However, the
magnitude of the problem seems overstated in light of practical
solutions that already exist and the existing power of courts to
render temporary restraining orders. For instance, sometimes in
trade secret cases the alleged misappropriator has no interest in
disclosing the alleged trade secrets because it is in his own
competitive interest to keep such information secret, and thus
there is little need for a quick seizure order. Similarly, trade
secret misappropriation cases have settled when the defendant
agrees to box up and seal whatever information (if any) he took
from a former employer in order to prevent the information from
being used or disclosed.
If, as appears to be the case, the proposed seizure order is
designed to address the special case of espionage (cyber or
otherwise), or more broadly the "improper means" prong of
misappropriation, there is undoubtedly the threat of destruction
of evidence because a foreign agent is likely to try to hide his
tracks. However, as discussed in Part II.C, this is precisely the
type of case that the EEA was designed to combat and that is
likely to garner the attention of federal prosecutors, who have the
power to obtain a search warrant. To the extent the concern is
about federal prosecutors not acting frequently or quickly enough,
that may be because there is little merit to the claims or because
the case does not involve espionage but, rather, a dispute
between competitors (which, as noted above, are the vast majority
of trade secret cases). In an era of tight resources, trade secret
claimants may take a back seat, particularly where the alleged
trade secret(s) at issue may be nonexistent. It may also be
because the EEA was adopted with the understanding that it
would be used judiciously. 6 2
62. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.64-5 (2014) (requiring U.S. attorneys to obtain the
"personal approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, or the Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division" before filing charges under the EEA); U.S.
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Critically, the seizure remedy gives powers to putative trade
secret trolls far beyond those possessed by current patent trolls.
The seizure remedy raises the same concerns that killed
copyright's Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) 63 and Protect
Intellectual Property Act (PIPA)64 in 2011.65 Like SOPA and
PIPA's doomed provisions, the proposed civil seizure process is
much broader than the impoundment remedy that exists under
U.S. copyright and trademark law because it is not limited to
allegedly infringing products. Instead, seizure would extend to
wide swaths of information that need not include actual trade
secrets. This powerful option makes the entire process even more
suspect than existing copyright and trademark remedies and
raises the specter of SOPA-like infirmities.
The chilling effect on innovation and job growth of receiving
a threat of litigation under the Acts could be profound. Under the
Acts' seizure remedy, mobile employees and fledgling start-up
businesses might have the tools of their trade, including
smartphones and computers, taken away from them based on an
unproven accusation. 66 Even if the Acts include heightened
requirements in order to obtain a seizure order, the courts may
never get the chance to adjudicate the issue. Rather, the
adjudication may happen in the marketplace, where the recipient
of a trade secret troll's letter (which would threaten a seizure
action) will have to decide if it has the capacity and resources to
challenge the claim in court. If it does not-which would be the
case for many potential recipients of such letters, from start-ups
to struggling companies-the practical impact could be a
settlement payment and, potentially, the end of the business.
Innovation may be lost, jobs may be terminated, and lives may be
ATTORNEY

MANUAL

§ 9-59.100

(2014),

available

at

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usam/title9/59merm.htm
(noting that the "EEA is not intended to criminalize every theft of trade secrets
for which civil remedies may exist under state law").
63. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
64. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
65. See Professors'Letter, supra note 14, at 6 n.10 (discussing the demise of
SOPA and PIPA).
66. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 27-31 (describing the seizure remedy in
the Acts).

256

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230 (2015)

devastated based upon an unproven allegation or a seizure
remedy improperly issued. That eventuality is SOPA magnified,
and is a major cause for alarm.
Moreover, the grant of this seizure remedy has no
extraterritorial impact and, in any event, foreign courts are
unlikely to enforce a U.S. court order issued ex parte without
notice or an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the seizure
remedy may actually be a godsend to those who wish to diminish
U.S. competitiveness; they would simultaneously empower trade
secret trolls with vast ability to quash U.S. competition, while
arming them with orders that have no meaningful impact outside
the United States, where the alleged trade secrets are
purportedly going! On this basis alone, the Acts should be
reconsidered.
As if the above reasons were not enough to abandon the Acts,
the proposed seizure remedy raises a number of constitutional
concerns. First, any seizure or other preliminary order that
requires an individual to turn over alleged trade secrets might, if
complied with, amount to compelled testimony with respect to
which the individual can assert the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 67 Moreover, it appears that the
claimed need for a seizure power is being used to introduce the
concept of a "civil search order" (also known as an Anton Piller
Order68) into U.S. law. This concept is untested and of
questionable constitutionality in the United States due to the
search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. 69
In sum, even if issues concerning the scope and meaning of
the proposed seizure remedy could be resolved, there are few
cases when it is actually needed. Many companies already have
evidence preservation policies in place, and when there is concern
that none exist, state and federal courts have the power to grant
preliminary relief and other orders to preserve evidence. In
67. See, e.g., Heddon v. State, 786 So. 2d 1262, 1263-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that employee's Fifth Amendment privilege would prohibit
forcing him to produce information in his possession).
68. Anton Piller K.G. v. Mfg. Processes, Ltd., [1975] EWCA (Civ) 12, [1976]
Ch. 55 (Eng.).
69. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
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egregious cases of alleged espionage, there is an even better
search and seizure remedy available for use by criminal
prosecutors.
Even more troubling are the powers that the seizure
authority would hand to the newly vivified trade secret trolls.
Under the Acts, trade secret trolls would gain a powerful tool that
could be used to significantly disrupt the business operation of a
competitor. Although it is argued that it would only be rarely
sought or granted, trolls, by definition, are predisposed not to
worry that much about the merits of their claims because the
greater the potential cost of litigation to their victims, the greater
the potential for a quick settlement. Trade secret trolls operate
based upon unsubstantiated threats of litigation, rather than a
concern about losing in court. The Acts create conditions where
trolling could become a highly lucrative business model, in which
the sources of revenue are start-ups, innovators, workers, and
society.
Thus, while ostensibly designed to address the problem of
foreign espionage, given the fact that most trade secret cases
involve domestic parties, the seizure remedy is more likely to be
used to disrupt U.S. businesses. The free-ranging power of trade
secret trolls to disrupt and destroy competitors through
aggressive use of the Acts is reason enough to pass on these wellmeaning but poorly conceived bills.
E. Federal Courts: "State Courts Will Not Handle These Cases in
a Timely Fashion, So We Need the Acts."
This somewhat baffling assertion ties to the general belief
that federal courts are much better equipped to handle
cyberespionage than their state counterparts. 70 However, there is
no comprehensive research or empirical data to back up the claim
that state courts are ill equipped to handle trade secret cases.
Instead, it seems to be based upon anecdotal experiences by
certain plaintiffs in one or more states. Without examining the
70. See Almeling, supra note 40, at 794 n.109 (discussing whether state
courts are able to address growing trade secret litigation); Seaman, supra note
17, at 51-52 (discussing the new availability of a federal forum under the Acts).
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actual record of cases when an alleged lack of response occurred,
it cannot be determined whether a court's refusal to hear or grant
a motion for a temporary restraining order was actually based
upon a lack of merit. The fact that many attorneys prefer to
litigate in federal court should not be a reason for adopting a new
federal cause of action.
The reality is that most trade secret misappropriation claims
are brought in the larger industrialized and high-tech states that
have special commercial courts or business law judges to handle
trade secret claims. To suggest that the judges of these courts,
who are likely to see numerous trade secret cases during their
tenure, are not competent to handle trade secret cases is
unjustified. Moreover, it is an affront to the U.S. system of
government to suggest that the incompetence of state judges is a
legitimate reason to adopt a federal law. We have many bodies of
law, including commercial law, that we rightly allow states to
develop and apply even though the resulting litigation may
involve parties from multiple states and countries. The Uniform
Commercial Code is but one example.
Far from being incapable of handling trade secret cases, state
court judges are more apt to understand the social values and
norms of their local community on such important issues as the
meaning of "improper means" of acquiring trade secrets, the
value of employee mobility, and the importance of free
competition. They are also in a better position based upon the
practices of local businesses and the availability of resources to
understand what "reasonable efforts" are available locally to
protect trade secrets. Lastly, unlike federal courts that often have
to predict how a state court might rule on an issue, state court
judges can actually make the rulings based upon their knowledge
of state law. Thus, it is fair to say that state court judges will be
and are as equipped to handle these complex matters and to
identify the trolling behavior about which the authors are
concerned.71

71. See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 17, at 55-56 (discussing the drawbacks of
litigating in a federal forum); cf. Almeling, supra note 26, at 293, 301 (discussing
the frequency with which trade secret litigation is brought in federal court).
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III. Alternatives
The risk of trade secret trolls, built around a primary concern
about cyberespionage, has been largely absent in the history of
trade secret law. They should be avoided, but Congress need not
ignore the cyberespionage problem in order to abandon the Acts.
Because there is no debate that trade secrets are important to
U.S. businesses and that they are being misappropriated to some
degree by foreign entities and agents, Congress should not simply
throw its figurative hands up and walk away from the problem.
Rather, Congress should consider ways to combat cyberespionage
without damaging trade secret law and unintentionally
summoning trade secret trolls.
This Article proposes a reorientation of focus around the tort
of misappropriation rather than the property concern of whether
a trade secret exists. 72 The following alternatives implement that
theoretical reorientation. By focusing on the bad acts of
misappropriation and deterring theft, rather than the asserted
property value of trade secrets, Congress can avert the trolls and
better address the real problem of cyberespionage.
A. Amend the Computer Fraudand Abuse Act
With respect to the most egregious forms of trade secret
misappropriation-cyberespionage and foreign espionage-there
are already two federal laws on the books to punish such
behavior: the aforementioned EEA and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act 73 (CFAA). The well-intentioned CFAA, designed to
criminalize unauthorized intrusions into computer networks, is
already notorious as an overbroad and ambiguous dragnet that
implicates at least as much legal activity as it does illegal. Thus,
it is in dire need of amendment to reflect what has been learned
and experienced since it was enacted in the pre-Internet age. 74
72. This concept is the focus of a work in progress by David S. Levine and
Franck Pasquale currently titled Tailoring Trade Secrecy: The Moral Imperative
of Industry-Specific Application of Doctrine.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
74. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Aaron's Law Is Doomed Leaving US
Hacking
Law
'Broken',
FORBES
(Aug.
6,
2014,
9:39
AM),
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To more directly combat cyberespionage and enforce
commercial ethics, the CFAA should be tailored to address
current threats and existing bad acts rather than trade secrets
specifically. In particular, the extraterritorial reach of the CFAA
and the predicate wrongful acts should be reconsidered. Perceived
problems with the existing language of the CFAA, which has
exposed individuals to criminal prosecution for lesser acts of
information access, 75 can be addressed at the same time. Fixing
the CFAA can provide a bonus for trade secret plaintiffs if it is
amended to allow security researchers greater ability to
understand and analyze modern hacking and cybersecurity
tactics without fear of running afoul of the law. 76 That research
can be rolled into improving existing corporate cybersecurity
abilities and standards.
There is also a political bonus in this proposed solution.
Because of widespread criticism of the CFAA, there might be
broad and bipartisan support for its reform. As there is little
debate that the acquisition of private commercial information (be
they trade secrets, proprietary information or otherwise) via
wrongful computer access should be deterred, we recommend
amending the CFAA to directly prohibit such behavior instead of
passing the Acts.
B. Improve Cybersecurity Standardsand Capabilities
As explained in a soon-to-be-published article by Sharon
Sandeen,7 7 the increased use of the "Cloud" to store and transfer
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2014/08/06/aarons-law-is-doomedleaving-us-hacking-law-broken/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) ("There is a general
agreement . . that the CFAA needs an urgent update.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
75. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding that an employee who emailed himself work documents during
extensive work travel did not violate the CFAA).
76. ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
HAMPERS SECURITY RESEARCH 2 (2014) ("The CFAA should protect white-hat

&

hackers and give them incentives to continue their important work."),
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cfaa-security-researchers.pdf.
77. Sharon Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud: Information Flows and the
Implications of Cloud Computing for Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J.L.
TECH.
(forthcoming
2015),
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data undermines the trade secret status of stored information
both from practical and legal standpoints. Congress might
ameliorate such risks by enacting legislation to clarify that the
mere storage of information in the Cloud (provided that other
reasonable efforts are engaged in by the trade secret owner) is not
a trade secrecy-waiving event. It should be noted that it is
currently impossible to completely protect a commercial computer
network from the most sophisticated and determined attackers,
although intrusions, once detected, can be contained.7 8
Nonetheless, the benefits of such a law might be conditioned on
trade secret owners utilizing enhanced security tools, thereby
providing an incentive for U.S. businesses to institute increased
security measures. 79
C. InternationalHarmonizationof Trade Secret Law and
Principles
The existing international trade secret harmonization efforts
are generally a good idea and should be continued,8 0 but even if
the laws of numerous countries are amended to conform more
closely to U.S. norms, there is still a lack of understanding among
businesses in the United States and elsewhere about what is
necessary to create and protect trade secret information.8 1 In this
regard, self-help designed to prevent trade secret theft in the first
instance is likely to be more effective and efficient than any new
law, and without the negative consequences of trade secret trolls.
The U.S. government should ramp up education in this area,
perhaps by publishing Trade Secret Management Guidelines

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2490671.
78. See Villasenor, supra note 19 (discussing other means to protect trade
secrets from cybersecurity intrusions).
79. Id.
80. Although the authors believe that they should be conducted in a more
open manner. See Sean Flynn, Sean Flynn, David Levine, Margot Kaminski:
Comment to USTR on the Public Interest Trade Advisory Committee Proposal,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG

(Mar, 25, 2014), http://infojustice.org/archives/32535

(last

visited Jan. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. See Villasenor, supra note 19 (discussing other means to protect trade
secrets from cybersecurity intrusions).
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similar to those published by the Japanese government. 82 We also
recommend training of state court judges to address concerns
about their inability to quickly address trade secret
misappropriation claims.
D. Streamlined Cross-BorderDiscovery and Enforcement
Because much of the concern surrounding the proposed trade
secret legislation is about the asserted difficulty of conducting
discovery and enforcing judgments across borders, Congress
should examine whether it can improve and streamline those
procedures. This would not only be of value in trade secret cases,
but in other commercial disputes as well. Indeed, the benefits of
the uniform law process in the United States should not be
ignored, suggesting that many problems that Congress perceives
might be more effectively resolved through the use of such
processes.
IV. Conclusion
The debate around the Acts is decidedly not about the
existence of harms. Even though trade secrecy suffers the same
dearth of data that has made the reaction to rampant copyright
infringement a guessing game between copyright maximalists
and civil society, 83 there is no question that U.S. companies face a

82.

See Release of Revised "Trade Secret Management Guidelines,"

MINISTRY

EcoN.,
TRADE,
&
INDUSTRY
(Dec.
1,
2011),
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2011/1201_01.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2015) (describing the contents of the Trade Secret Management Guidelines,
which are not readily available in English) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The Federal Trade Commission offers guidance (albeit on the
unrelated subject of advertising) in a similar format, which could serve as the
model for propounding U.S. guidelines on the subject. See Advertising and
Marketing, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/businesscenter/advertising-and-marketing (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
83. This issue arose in the context of the battle over SOPA. See Yochai

Benkler et al., Social Mobilization and the Networked Public Sphere: Mapping
the SOPA-PIPA Debate (Berkman Ctr. Research Publ'n No. 2013-16, July 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2295953.
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mounting and complex threat from state-backed cyberespionage.
The Sony scenario should only add to the perceived urgency. This
Article is intended to orient the discussion about the Acts around
the tort of misappropriation, which is the problem of
cyberespionage, rather than the property right of trade secret
ownership. The Article squarely addresses the arguments offered
in favor of the Acts and explains the shortcomings of trade secret
law as a solution, as well as the downside risks involving access
to information and collaboration. Of equal importance, the Article
proposes alternative avenues of exploration that have a much
better chance of offering relief to beleaguered U.S. companies,
their customers, and all who value commercial ethics in the
marketplace of ideas.
We should all be alarmed by the possibility of creating
conditions ripe for introducing trolling behavior into trade
secrecy. Trade secret trolls have been unable to emerge thus far
because of the strengths of uniform state law and the checks
against abuse found in established trade secret principles and
corollary state law involving noncompete covenants and invention
ownership. But the free-ranging, plaintiff-oriented Acts will
destroy that delicate balance and defeat the very purpose of trade
secret law as a force of maintenance of commercial ethics.
Simultaneously, the Acts will replace that balance by creating
near-perfect conditions for the rise of trade secret trolls, moving
cyberespionage from the first to the second most important issue
in trade secrecy law and practice for trade secret holders.
For the foregoing reason in particular and, more generally,
for all of the reasons discussed above, this Article urges
abandonment of the Acts and offers other possible solutions. The
Acts do much harm and little, if any, good. Let's leave trolls to the
annals of science fiction (and patent law) and advance an
environment where entrepreneurship, employee mobility, and
legitimate access to information can flourish.
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